

**1240B THREAT TO A JUDGE — § 940.203(2)****Statutory Definition of the Crime**

Section 940.203 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin is violated by one who intentionally threatens to cause bodily harm to the (person) (family member) of any judge where, at the time of the act, the person knows<sup>1</sup> that the victim is a (judge) (family member of a judge), the act is in response to an action taken in the judge's official capacity,<sup>2</sup> and there is no consent by the person harmed.

**State's Burden of Proof**

Before you may find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove by evidence that satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following six elements were present.

**Elements of the Crime That the State Must Prove**

1. The defendant threatened to cause bodily harm to (name of victim).

[A "threat" is an expression of intention to do harm and may be communicated orally, in writing, or by conduct. This element requires a true threat. "True threat" means that a reasonable person would interpret the threat as a serious expression of intent to do harm, and the person making the statement is aware that others could regard the statement as a threat and delivers it anyway. It is not necessary that the person making the threat have the ability to carry out the threat. You must consider all the circumstances in determining whether a threat is a true threat.]<sup>3</sup>

“Bodily harm” means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.<sup>4</sup>

2. (Name of victim) was a (judge) (family member of a judge).

[For the purpose of this offense, a (e.g., circuit court judge) is a judge.]<sup>5</sup>

[For the purpose of this offense, a (e.g., child) is a family member.]<sup>6</sup>

3. The defendant knew<sup>7</sup> that (name of victim) was a (judge) (family member of a judge).

4. The threat was in response to an action taken in the judge’s official capacity.

Judges act in an official capacity when they perform duties that they are employed<sup>8</sup> to perform.<sup>9</sup> [The duties of a judge include: \_\_\_\_\_].<sup>10</sup>

5. The defendant threatened to cause bodily harm to (name of victim) without the consent<sup>11</sup> of (name of victim).

6. The defendant acted intentionally.<sup>12</sup> This requires that the defendant acted with the mental purpose to threaten bodily harm to (name of victim), or was aware that his or her conduct was practically certain to cause that result, and knew that (name of victim) did not consent to the causing of bodily harm.<sup>13</sup>

### **Deciding About Intent and Knowledge**

You cannot look into a person’s mind to find intent or knowledge. Intent and knowledge must be found, if found at all, from the defendant’s acts, words, and statements, if any, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent and

knowledge.

### **Jury's Decision**

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all six elements of this offense have been proved, you should find the defendant guilty.

If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.

### **COMMENT**

Wis JI-Criminal 1240B was originally published in 1994 and revised in 2002, 2016, 2018, 2019, and 2020. The 2002 revision divided the single instruction into two instructions, WI JI-Criminal 1240A and 1240B. Wis JI-Criminal 1240A was revised in 2008 to change the definition of “official capacity.” The 2016 revision updated the Comment to reflect changes made by the 2015 Wisconsin Act 78. The 2018 revision reflected changes made by 2017 Wisconsin Act 272 and 2017 Wisconsin Act 352. The 2020 revision added the definition of “true threat.” This revision was approved by the Committee in October 2023. It amended the definition of a “true threat” according to Counterman v. Colorado, 600 US --- (2023), to clarify that the assessment of the threat requires consideration of both the speaker’s perspective (recklessness standard) and the victim’s perspective (reasonable person standard).

Section 940.203 was created by 1993 Wisconsin Act 50 [effective date: November 25, 1993] and originally applied only to offenses against judges and their family members. It was amended by 2015 Wisconsin Act 78 [effective date: November 13, 2015] to add prosecutors and law enforcement officers. Section 940.203 was amended again by 2017 Wisconsin Act 272 [effective date: April 13, 2018] to include officers of the court. 2017 Wisconsin Act 352 [effective date: April 18, 2018] amended the definitions of “judge” and “law enforcement officer.” This instruction is drafted for violations under § 940.203 involving threats to a judge; for violations based on battery to a judge, see Wis-JI Criminal 1240A. For battery and threats to prosecutors and law enforcement officers, see Wis JI-Criminal 1240C and 1240D. For battery and threats to a current or former guardian ad litem, corporation counsel, or attorney, see Wis JI-Criminal 1241A and 1241B.

1. Neither the summary of the offenses here nor the third element contain the alternative “or should have known” found as part of the offense definition in sec. 940.203(2)(a). The Committee believed the phrase would be inapplicable in virtually all cases because a connection is required between the act or threat and the prosecutor’s or law enforcement officer’s official capacity. That is, the act or threat must be committed in response to an action taken in the person’s official capacity. Therefore, it may be confusing to instruct the jury on the “should have known” alternative. Of course, if that alternative fits the facts of the case, it should be added to the instruction.

2. 2015 Wisconsin Act 109 amended § 940.203 to delete what was previously an alternative for this aspect of the offense definition: "... the judge is acting in an official capacity at the time of the act or threat..."

3. This definition is based on one of the descriptions of "true threat" in State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 28, 243 Wis.2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762. Perkins held that a jury instruction for a threat to a judge in violation of § 940.203 was an incomplete statement of the law because it did not define "threat" as "true threat." This created an unacceptable risk that "the jury may have used the common definition of 'threat,' thereby violating the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of speech." 2001 WI 46, ¶43. The court stated: "The common definition of threat is an expression of an intention to inflict injury on another. The definition of threat for the purposes of the statute criminalizing language is much narrower." 2001 WI 46, 43.

The following is the most complete definition of "true threat" offered by the court in Perkins:

A true threat is a statement that a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly protected speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out the threat. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 2001 WI 46, 29.

The Committee concluded that the definition in the instruction is equivalent in context and will be more understandable to the jury. In a case decided at the same time as Perkins, the court used a definition much like the one used in the instruction. See State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, 23, 243 Wis.2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712.

Perkins involved an orally communicated threat. The instruction is drafted more broadly to be applicable whether the threat is communicated orally, in writing, or by conduct.

In Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 135 S.Ct. 2011 (2015), the United States Supreme Court interpreted a federal statute making it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce "any communication containing any threat ... to injure the person of another." 18 USC § 875(c). Because the statute was not clear as to what mental state was required, there was a split in the federal circuits on that issue. Elonis was convicted under instructions that required the jury to find that he communicated what a reasonable person would regard as a threat. The Supreme Court concluded that this was not sufficient: "Federal criminal liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the defendant's mental state." The decision did not specify what mental state is required. The decision was based on constitutional requirements – it was a matter of interpreting a federal statute – so it has no direct impact on Wisconsin law. The Committee concluded that the definition of "true threat" used in this instruction is sufficient to meet any requirements that may be implied from the decision in Elonis, especially in light of element 6, which requires that "the defendant acted with the mental purpose to threaten bodily harm to another..."

4. This is the definition of "bodily harm" provided in § 939.22(4).

5. Section 940.203(1)(b) provides a definition of "judge" for the purpose of this offense. As amended by 2017 Wisconsin Act 352, that definition provides: "'Judge' means a person who currently is

or who formerly was a supreme court justice, court of appeals judge, circuit court judge, municipal judge, tribal judge, temporary or permanent reserve judge or circuit, supplemental, or municipal court commissioner.”

The applicable term should be inserted in the blank.

6. Section 940.203(1)(a) provides a definition of “family member” for the purpose of this offense: “‘Family member’ means a parent, spouse, sibling, child, stepchild, or foster child.”

The applicable term should be inserted in the blank.

7. See note 1, supra.

8. “Employed” is used here in the general sense of being engaged in the performance of a duty.

9. The definition of “official capacity” is taken from Wis JI-Criminal 915. See the Comment to that instruction for further discussion.

10. The duties of judges may be set forth in the Wisconsin Statutes. When that is the case, the Committee suggests using the sentence in brackets and describing the duties in the blank. The Committee has concluded that the jury may be informed of the law that declares what a person’s official duties are without running the risk of directing a verdict on an element of the crime. It is still for the jury to determine whether the person was performing the duty in the particular case. But see State v. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256, 306 Wis.2d 572, 743 N.W.2d 468; and State v. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257, 306 Wis.2d 598, 743 N.W.2d 823.

11. If the definition of “without consent” is believed to be necessary, see Wis JI-Criminal 948, which provides an instruction based on the definition provided in § 939.22(48). That definition provides that “without consent” means “no consent in fact” or that consent was given because of fear, a claim of legal authority by the defendant, or misunderstanding.

12. “Intentionally” requires either a mental purpose to cause the result or awareness that the conduct is practically certain to cause it. § 939.23(3). The Committee concluded that the mental purpose alternative is most likely to apply to this offense. See Wis JI-Criminal 923A and 923B.

“Intentionally” also generally requires knowledge of all facts necessary to make the conduct criminal which follow the word “intentionally” in the statute. § 939.23(3). This general rule appears to be countered by the drafting style of § 940.203, which divides the facts necessary to constitute the crime among several subsections of the statute. The Committee concluded that the knowledge requirement that usually accompanies the use of “intentionally” does not carry over to the three facts set forth in (2)(a), through (b) and (c). Sub. (2)(a) has its own mental state – “knows or should have known” and thereby breaks the connections between “intentionally” used in sub. (2) proper and the other facts that follow.

13. The requirement that the defendant know there is no consent is based on the definition of “intentionally” in § 939.23(3): “. . . the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word intentionally.