

**1242 BATTERY OR THREAT TO A DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
EMPLOYEE — § 940.205**

Statutory Definition of the Crime

Section 940.205 of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin is violated by one who intentionally (causes) (threatens to cause) bodily harm to the (person) (family member) of any Department of Revenue employee¹ where at the time of the (act) (threat), the person knows² that the victim is a (Department of Revenue employee) (family member of a Department of Revenue employee), [the Department of Revenue employee is acting in an official capacity], [the (act) (threat) is in response to an action taken in the Department of Revenue employee's official capacity],³ and there is no consent by the person (harmed) (threatened).

State's Burden of Proof

Before you may find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the following six elements were present.

Elements of the Crime That the State Must Prove

1. The defendant (caused) (threatened to cause) bodily harm to (name of victim).

"Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.⁴

IF THE CASE INVOLVES CAUSING BODILY HARM, ADD THE FOLLOWING:

["Cause" means that the defendant's act was a substantial factor in producing the bodily harm.]⁵

IF THE CASE INVOLVES A THREAT, ADD THE FOLLOWING:

[A "threat" is an expression of intention to do harm and may be communicated orally, in writing, or by conduct. This element requires a true threat. "True threat" means that a reasonable person making the threat would foresee that a reasonable person would interpret the threat as a serious expression of intent to do harm. It is not necessary that the person making the threat have the ability to carry out the threat. You must consider all the circumstances in determining whether a threat is a true threat.]⁶

2. (Name of victim) was a (Department of Revenue employee) (family member of a Department of Revenue employee).

[For the purpose of this offense, a (e.g., child) is a family member.]⁷

3. At the time of the (act) (threat) the defendant knew⁸ that (name of victim) was a (Department of Revenue employee) (family member of a Department of Revenue employee).
4. [The Department of Revenue employee was acting in an official capacity at the time of the (act) (threat).] [The (act) (threat) was in response to an action taken in the Department of Revenue employee's official capacity.]⁹

Department of Revenue employees act in an official capacity when they perform duties that they are employed¹⁰ to perform.¹¹ (The duties of a Department of Revenue employee include: _____.)¹²

5. The defendant (caused) (threatened to cause) bodily harm without the consent¹³ of (name of victim).
6. The defendant acted intentionally. This requires that the defendant acted with the mental purpose to (cause) (threaten to cause) bodily harm.¹⁴

Deciding About Intent

You cannot look into a person's mind to find intent. Intent must be found, if found at all, from the defendant's acts, words, and statements, if any, and from all the facts and circumstances in this case bearing upon intent.

Jury's Decision

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all six elements of this offense have been proved, you should find the defendant guilty.

If you are not so satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty.

COMMENT

Wis JI-Criminal 1242 was originally published in 1994 and revised in 2004 to add a definition of "true threat." This revision was approved by the Committee in February 2008; it revised the definition of "official capacity."

Section 940.205 was created by 1985 Wisconsin Act 29.

1. Section 940.205 applies to offenses against the person or family of any department of revenue "official, employee or agent." The instruction refers to "employee" throughout, since that appears to be the most inclusive term.

2. Neither the summary of the offense here nor the third element contain the alternative "or should have known" that is provided in the statute [see subsec. (2)(a)]. The Committee believed the phrase would be inapplicable in virtually all cases because a connection is required between the act or threat and the Department of Revenue employee's official capacity. That is, the threat or act must be committed either when the Department of Revenue employee is acting in an official capacity or in response to an action taken in the Department of Revenue employee's official capacity. In either situation, it may be confusing to instruct the jury on the "should have known" alternative. Of course, if that alternative fits the facts of the case, it should be added to the instruction.

3. One of the alternatives in brackets should be selected.

4. This is the definition provided in § 939.22(4).

5. The Committee concluded that the simple "substantial factor" definition of cause should be sufficient for most cases. Where there is evidence of more than one possible cause, something like the following might be added:

There may be more than one cause of bodily harm. The act of one person alone might produce it, or the acts of two more persons might jointly produce it.

Also see Wis JI-Criminal 901, Cause.

6. This definition is based on one of the descriptions of "true threat" in State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶28, 243 Wis.2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762. Perkins held that a jury instruction for a threat to a judge in violation of § 940.203 was an incomplete statement of the law because it did not define "threat" as "true threat." This created an unacceptable risk that "the jury may have used the common definition of 'threat,' thereby violating the defendant's constitutional right to freedom of speech." 2001 WI 46, ¶43. The court stated: "The common definition of threat is an expression of an intention to inflict injury on another. The definition of threat for the purposes of a statute criminalizing threatening language is much narrower." 2001 WI 46, ¶43.

The following is the most complete definition of "true threat" offered by the court in Perkins:

A true threat is a statement that a speaker would reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other similarly protected speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out the threat. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, the totality of the circumstances must be considered. 2001 WI 46, ¶29.

The Committee concluded that the definition in the instruction is equivalent in content and will be more understandable to the jury. In a case decided at the same time as Perkins, the court used a definition much like the one used in the instruction. See State v. A.S., 2001 WI 48, ¶23, 243 Wis.2d 173, 626 N.W.2d 712.

Perkins involved an orally communicated threat. The instruction is drafted more broadly to be applicable whether the threat is communicated orally, in writing, or by conduct.

7. Section 940.205(1) provides:

"In this section, family member" means a parent, spouse, sibling, child, stepchild, foster child or treatment foster child.

The applicable term should be inserted in the blank.

8. See note 2, supra.

9. One of the alternatives in brackets should be selected.

10. "Employed" is used here in the general sense of being engaged in the performance of a duty.

11. The definition of "official capacity" is taken from Wis JI-Criminal 915. See the Comment to that instruction for further discussion.

12. The duties, powers, or responsibilities of some public officers, officials, and employees are set forth in the Wisconsin Statutes or Administrative Code. When that is the case, the Committee suggests using the sentence in brackets and describing the duties in the blank. The Committee has concluded that the jury may be informed of the law that declares what a person's official duties are without running the risk of directing a verdict on an element of the crime. It is still for the jury to determine whether the person was performing the duty in the particular case. But see, State v. Jensen, 2007 WI App 256, ___ Wis.2d ___, 743 N.W.2d 468; and, State v. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257, ___ Wis.2d ___, 743 N.W.2d 823.

13. If definition of "without consent" is believed to be necessary, see Wis JI-Criminal 948 which provides an instruction based on the definition provided in § 939.22(48). That definition provides that "without consent" means "no consent in fact" or that consent was given because of fear, a claim of legal authority by the defendant, or misunderstanding.

14. "Intentionally" requires either mental purpose to cause the result or awareness that the conduct is practically certain to cause it. § 939.23(3). The Committee concluded that the mental purpose alternative is most likely to apply to this offense. See Wis JI-Criminal 923A and 923B.

"Intentionally" also generally requires knowledge of all facts necessary to make the conduct criminal which follow the word "intentionally" in the statute. § 939.23(3). This general rule appears to be countered by the drafting style of § 940.205 which divides the facts necessary to constitute the crime among several subsections of the statute. The Committee concluded that the knowledge requirement that usually accompanies the use of "intentionally" does not carry over to the three facts set forth in (2)(a), through (b) and (c). Sub. (2)(a) has its own mental state – "knows or should know" – and thereby breaks the connection between "intentionally" used in sub. (2) proper and the other facts that follow.