# SM-34A DETERMINING SENTENCE CREDIT UNDER SECTION 973.155

# CONTENTS

# Introduction 3

# The Basic Rule 3

# Procedure for Making the Finding of Sentence Credit in All Cases 4

# Tell the parties to be prepared to address sentence credit at sentencing 4

# Make a finding after the proper disposition has been determined 5

# Make a finding in every case 5

# Make the finding in terms of a number of days 5

# If no credit is due, make that finding 6

# Apply the credit to the sentence being served 6

# An Explanation of the Basic Rule 6

# In custody 6

# “Custody” based on liability under the escape statute 7

# “Custody” as defined in § 946.42(1)(a)1 7

# “Custody” based on unauthorized departure from certain correctional settings 8

# Participation in certain AODA programs covered by § 973.155(1m) 9

# Custody during competency proceeding commitments 9

# Situations not considered to constitute “custody” 10

# …In connection with 10

# Determining whether a connection exists 10

# A connection between custody and a charge may be “severed” 11

# …the course of conduct for which the sentence is being imposed 12

# Applying the Basic Rule in Common Situations 13

# The credit determination to make at the time of original disposition in all

# cases 13

# Imposing sentence after probation has been revoked in a sentence

# withheld case 13

# Determining sentence credit at all time of sentencing after revocation 13

# “Custody” during the period of probation 14

# Jail time as a condition of probation 14

# Time in a treatment facility as a condition of probation 14

# Sentence credit in multiple sentence situations 14

# Concurrent sentences 15

# Multiple counts in a single judgement 16

# Sentences on unrelated charges for which different amounts

# of credit are due 16

# A sentence imposed to run concurrently with a sentence

# imposed earlier 17

# Concurrent sentences imposed after revocation of probation

# and revocation of a deferred entry of judgement agreement 20

# Consecutive sentences 20

# Multiple counts in a single judgment 21

# Sentence to run consecutively to a sentence imposed by

# another court 21

# Multiple sentences with differing amounts of credit 22

# Sentence to run consecutively to a sentence imposed

# following revocation or probation 22

# Correcting Sentence Credit Errors 23

1. **Introduction**

Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) establishes the basic rule governing sentence credit: An offender is entitled to sentence credit for time he or she spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed. In addition, § 973.155(2) requires a sentencing court to make a specific finding of the number of days for which sentence credit is to be granted to an offender under § 973.155 and to include that finding in the judgment of conviction. The purpose of this Special Material is to assist the court in making a proper determination of sentence credit.

A sentencing court must give credit accorded by the statute because an offender may not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced.1 Sentence credit has the effect of reducing the amount of time the offender serves in jail or, for bifurcated sentences, in prison under the term of confinement before reaching the date on which he or she is released to the term of extended supervision. That is because, with one exception,2 when credit is granted an offender’s sentence is computed as having begun as many days before the date of sentencing as days credit have been granted. For example, an offender sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, consisting of five years of confinement and five years of extended supervision, and entitled to six months of credit will be released to extended supervision four years, six months from the date of sentencing.

The basic rule for determining credit is easily stated, but its application can be difficult, particularly in situations in which an offender has multiple cases with different periods of pretrial custody and concurrent or consecutive sentences. To help the sentencing court understand and apply the basic rule, this Special Material proceeds as follows. First, it explains the basic rule governing sentence credit. Next, it discusses procedural and technical aspects of making a credit determination. It then provides a detailed explanation of the basic rule used to determine the number of days for which credit is due. After that explanation, it discusses situations that arise with some regularity, and illustrates, with reference to case law, if available, how to determine credit in those situations. Finally, it provides information about correcting a finding of sentence credit.

1. **The Basic Rule**

The basic rule for determining sentence credit is set forth in § 973.155(1) and (1m), which read as follows:

**(1)(a)** A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct

for which sentence was imposed. As used in this subsection, “actual days spent in custody” includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:

1. While the offender is awaiting trial;

2. While the offender is being tried; and

3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.

(b) The categories in par. (a) and sub. (1m) include custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or in part the result of a probation, extended supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113 (8m), 302.114 (8m), 304.06 (3), or 973.10 (2) placed upon the person for the same course of conduct as that resulting in the new conviction.

**(1m)** A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody as part of a substance abuse treatment program that meets the requirements of s. 165.95 (3), as determined by the department of justice under s. 165.95 (9) and (10), for any offense arising out of the course of conduct that led to the person’s placement in that program.

The basic rule, then, is that entitlement to sentence credit depends on the offender having been in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed.3 A defendant seeking sentence credit has the burden of demonstrating both custody and its connection with the course of conduct for which the sentence was imposed.4 Entitlement does not depend on the offender’s inability to post bond.

The focus of this Special Material is the determination of sentence credit for days spent in custody up to the date of sentencing, as identified in the three periods of time listed in § 973.155(1)(a).5 It will also address credit when imposing sentence in sentence withheld – probation ordered cases, which may include time the offender spent in custody while on probation.

1. **Procedure for Making the Finding of Sentence Credit in All Cases**
2. **Tell the parties to be prepared to address sentence credit at sentencing**

A great saving of judicial time and energy can be realized if an accurate determination of sentence credit is made at the time the judgment of conviction is entered, when the facts are fresh, records are available, and the defendant and counsel are present to address the issue. Therefore, the court should require the parties to be prepared to address the sentence credit issue at the time of sentencing. Disputes about the number of days for which credit is due should be anticipated and settled before judgment is entered, by stipulation6 or, if necessary, further hearing. Accurate information and the informed participation of prosecutor and defense counsel are essential.

1. **Make a finding after the proper disposition has been determined**

In all cases, the court should first follow its usual procedure to determine the appropriate disposition. After the decision as to type and length of disposition has been made, the finding of the number of days for which sentence credit is due should be made.7

1. **Make a finding in every case**

The finding regarding sentence credit should be made in every case, including those where the disposition is probation or the sentence is to home detention under § 973.03(4).8 Although § 973.155 does not explicitly require that the sentence credit determination be made in cases where sentence is withheld and probation ordered, making the finding in probation cases will document the finding of credit due up to the date of disposition and make it available if probation is later revoked. (NOTE: The finding on the original judgment will relate only to the credit due as of the date of that judgment; additional credit may also be appropriate at the time of revocation for custody during the revocation process. The consideration of other periods of time in the sentence withheld – probation ordered and revoked case is discussed below, in Section V.B.)

In a case in which the disposition is probation and the court orders jail time as a condition under § 973.09(4), any sentence credit the court grants does not have to be credited against the condition time, although the court has discretion to do so.9

1. **Make the finding in terms of a number of days**

The defendant is entitled to a day of sentence credit for each calendar day during which he or she spent at least part of the day in custody. State v. Johnson, 2018 WI App 2, 379 Wis.2d 684, 906 N.W.2d 704, 2018 WI App 2, ¶8. The only exception to this rule is that the defendant is not entitled to sentence credit for the day on which he or she is sentenced because the Department of Corrections counts that day toward the service of the sentence. State v. Kontny, 2020 WI App 30, ¶¶10-12, 392 Wis. 2d 311, 943 N.W.2d 923. Only the number of days for which credit is due should be determined by the court. That number should be entered on the judgment of conviction. The standard judgment of conviction form adopted by the Judicial Conference and mandated for use under § 971.025(1) includes a blank for entering a finding of the number of days of credit.

The finding should be in terms of the number of days and should not be expressed as weeks, months, years, or fractions thereof. The sentencing court should not determine the date sentence is to commence. The prison registrar or jail custodian will compute the sentence. As noted in the Introduction, the sentence will be computed as though it had begun as many days before the date of sentencing as days credit have been granted. That is, the sentence of an offender sentenced by the court on May 1, and entitled to 30 days sentence credit, will be computed as though it began on April 1. The date on which the offender is eligible for release will be calculated by the prison registrar or jail custodian as though the sentence had begun April 1.

1. **If no credit is due, make that finding**

The court should make a specific finding even when it determines that no credit is due. Insert “No” or “0” in the blank provided for the sentence credit finding. This will avoid future questions about whether credit was considered.

1. **Apply the credit to the sentence being served**

When sentence credit is applied at the time of sentencing, the circuit court should apply sentence credit to the term of incarceration.10 For instance, if an offender is entitled to credit applicable to charges for which he receives both an imposed sentence and a stayed sentence, the credit must be applied to the imposed sentence.11

1. **An Explanation of the Basic Rule**

The basic rule established by § 973.155 is that an offender is entitled to sentence credit if the person was (A) in custody and the custody was (B) in connection with (C) the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed. If one of these requirements is not met, the defendant is not entitled to credit.

1. **In custody…**

“In custody” is not defined in § 973.155, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that “for purposes of sentence credit an offender’s status constitutes custody whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that status.” State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, ¶31, 233 Wis.2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536.

This means the inquiry into whether an offender was in “custody” begins with the definition of “custody” provided in the escape statute, § 946.42(1)(a)1. In the majority of cases, application of that definition will be sufficient. In some cases, however, the court may also have to consider whether the offender was in a status that subjected him or her to an escape charge for leaving that status.

1. **“Custody” based on liability under the escape statute**
2. **“Custody” as defined in § 946.42(1)(a)1.**

Section 946.42(1)(a)1. provides that “custody” includes without limitation the following:

a. Actual custody of an institution, including a juvenile correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (10p), a secured residential care center for children and youth, as defined in s. 938.02 (15g), a juvenile detention facility, as defined in

s. 938.02 (10r), a Type 2 residential care center for children and youth, as defined in s. 938.02 (19r), a facility used for the detention of persons detained under

s. 980.04 (1), a facility specified in s. 980.065, or a juvenile portion of a county jail.12

b. Actual custody of a peace officer or institution guard.

bm. Actual custody or authorized physical control of a correctional officer.

c. Actual custody or authorized physical control of a probationer, parolee, or person on extended supervision by the department of corrections.

e. Constructive custody of persons placed on supervised release under ch. 980.

f. Constructive custody of prisoners and juveniles subject to an order under s. 48.366, 938.183, 938.34 (4d), (4h), or (4m), or 938.357 (4) or (5)(e) temporarily outside the institution whether for the purpose of work, school, medical care, a leave granted under s. 303.068, a temporary leave or furlough granted to a juvenile, or otherwise.

g. Custody of the sheriff of the county to which the prisoner was transferred after conviction.

h. Custody of a person subject to a confinement order under s. 973.09(4).

The following situations are within this definition of custody:

• Detention in the county jail before bail is set or thereafter;

• Detention in the county jail during nonworking hours as a condition of bail release or probation;13

• Detention in jail in another state when that detention results at least in part from a Wisconsin warrant;14

• Time spent in secure juvenile detention pending a waiver to adult court, when jurisdiction is waived and an adult sentence is imposed;15

• Time spent at an in-house rehabilitation center when “temporarily outside the [jail] for the purpose of medical care.”16

1. **“Custody” based on unauthorized departure from certain correctional settings**

Under Magnuson a person who is in a correctional program that does not constitute “custody” under the definition in § 946.42(1)(a) is still entitled to credit if the statute that creates the correctional program allows for an escape charge for unauthorized departure from the program. Magnuson, 233 Wis.2d 40, ¶¶26-30. In most cases this basis for “custody” will not come into play, as the correctional programs covered by the definition are for offenders who have already been sentenced. Nonetheless, such claims may arise in cases where an offender was in custody on more than one case or charge, so the court and counsel should be aware of the programs that are covered. They include:

• The community residential confinement program under § 301.046;

• The intensive sanctions program under § 301.048;

• Jail labor off the institution grounds under § 302.37(4);

• Home detention under § 302.425;

• Prison labor off the institution grounds under § 303.03;

• Work release plans for prison inmates under § 303.065; and

• County work camps under § 303.10;

• Placement of a juvenile offender in a setting specified under

§§ 938.357(4)(a), 938.533(3)(a), 938.538(4)(a), and 938.539(1).

1. **Participation in certain AODA programs covered by § 973.155(1m)**

Under § 973.155(1m), a person is entitled to credit “for all days spent in custody as part of a substance abuse treatment program that meets the requirements of s. 165.95(3), as determined by the Office of Justice Assistance under s. 165.95(9) and (10) for any offense arising out of the course of conduct that led to the person’s placement in that program.” The substance abuse treatment programs referred to are those mandated for participants in a qualified “treatment” court.

The Committee concluded that the standard for determining whether the person’s status constituted “custody” for purposes of sub. (1m) is the same standard that applies under sub. (1): If the offender was subject to an escape charge for leaving the status, sentence credit should be granted for time spent in that status. Further, § 973.155(1m) is clear that credit for the time the offender was in the treatment program may be applied only to the sentence for the offense being handled in the treatment court.

1. **Custody during competency proceeding commitments.**

Under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(2)(a), a person committed to a mental health facility for an inpatient competency examination is deemed to be in custody under § 973.155 while he or she is in the facility. Under Wis. Stat. § 971.14(5)(a)3., the days a person spends in a commitment for competency treatment, whether inpatient or outpatient, are also considered days spent in custody under § 973.155.

1. **Situations not considered to constitute “custody”**

Not included within the definitions of “custody” for sentence credit purposes are the following situations:

• Conditions of release on bond that do not involve spending parts of each day in the county jail;17

• Voluntary participation in drug, alcohol, or other treatment programs even though the offender may not be completely free of all restraint on his liberty during such program,18 unless the program is covered under § 973.155(1m);

• Home detention under a federal consent decree designed to reduce jail overcrowding;19

• Time spent on electronic monitoring as a condition of probation.20

• Time spent in the community after the person reports to jail but is turned away due to overcrowding or after the person is released early from a period of confinement, even though the person was turned away or released early through no fault of his or her own.21

1. **…in connection with…**
2. **Determining whether a connection exists**

The requirement that custody be “in connection with” the course of conduct means simply that the custody must be, at least in part, the result of a legal status (arrest, bail, Department of Corrections hold, court order, etc.) stemming from the course of conduct for which sentence is being imposed. If the offender was under restraint for reasons related to the course of conduct, credit is required.22

The connection between the custody and the conduct for which sentence is imposed must be a factual connection, not just a “procedural” or “tangential” one.23 For example, the fact that an offender is sentenced in multiple cases at the same time does not create a connection between custody and the sentences imposed.24

Where there are multiple charges an offender’s custody may be “in connection with” one charge but not another. Thus, the filing of a detainer against someone already in custody on other charges does not result in “custody” on the charges covered by the detainer.25 Similarly, an offender is in general not entitled to sentence credit under § 973.155 for custody that is being served in satisfaction of another unrelated criminal sentence.26

For example, if an offender serving a sentence for theft is charged with battery to another inmate, his custody is connected only to the theft sentence, not to the battery charge, as long as he is serving that theft sentence.27

As another example, assume a person is released on personal recognizance on one charge but later is arrested on a different charge and remains in custody as a result of an inability to post cash bail. When sentenced, the person is entitled to credit only on the sentence for the charge on which he was held in custody. This is true even if the charge on which he was in custody was bail jumping based on a violation of the conditions of the personal recognizance bond in the other case.28

1. **A connection between custody and a charge may be “severed”**

When an offender has multiple charges, a period of custody may initially be connected to all of the charges, but an event relating to one of the charges may “sever” that connection. Once the connection between custody and a particular charge is severed, the offender no longer earns credit toward that charge.

The most common way for a connection between custody and multiple charges to be severed is by sentencing on one of the charges. For instance, assume a person is arrested and held in custody in two separate cases, A and B. If he is sentenced in Case A before he is sentenced in Case B, the sentencing in Case A severs the connection between the custody and Case B, and he is in custody solely for the conviction in Case A. Thus, the person is not entitled to credit toward Case B for any time in custody after being sentenced in Case A.29

Another common way for the connection between custody and pending charges to be severed is for the offender to commence serving a previously imposed and stayed sentence after revocation of probation or be returned to prison after revocation of extended supervision. In those situations, relevant statutes provide that the offender commences the previously imposed sentence upon entering the prison system.30

1. **…the course of conduct for which sentence is being imposed**

The use of “course of conduct” rather than a more limited term, such as “offense” or “crime,” suggests that credit is to extend to periods of custody that may not have been caused by the specific crime for which sentence is ultimately imposed. Credit is required in at least four situations which raise the “course of conduct” issue:

1. Where several crimes were charged as a result of a single course of conduct, but the offender is convicted of only one crime. Thus, an offender held in custody as a result of charges of theft, burglary, and battery, all resulting from a single incident, must receive sentence credit even if he is convicted of only one of the crimes charged;

2. Where offenses for which the person spent time in custody are “read in” for purposes of sentencing in another case, the offender is entitled to credit for the custody on the read-in offenses, regardless of whether the read-in offenses are factually connected to the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed;31

3. Where the offender is convicted of a crime which is a lesser included offense of the crime originally charged. Thus, an offender is entitled to credit if he was arrested for and charged with armed robbery even if he is convicted of the lesser included crime of theft; and

4. Where the offender is held in custody on a probation, parole, or extended supervision hold which is issued due to the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed. (See § 973.155(1)(b).) Credit will be due toward both the sentence for the course of conduct and the sentence in the case in which the hold was issued up to the time the defendant begins serving one of the sentences, unless the sentences are consecutive.32

Note, however, that “course of conduct” does not mean “criminal episode.” In State v. Tuescher, 226 Wis.2d 465, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999), the court held “a defendant earns credit toward a future sentence while serving another sentence only when both sentences are imposed for the same specific acts.” Id., 479.33

1. **Applying the Basic Rule in Common Situations**
2. **The credit determination to make at the time of original disposition in all cases**

The determination to be made at the time of original disposition in all cases is the period of time the offender spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct up to the date of sentencing. The statute identifies three periods of time, namely, those occurring:

1) while the offender is awaiting trial;

2) while the offender is being tried; and

3) while the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.

1. **Imposing sentence after probation has been revoked in a sentence withheld case**
2. **Determining sentence credit at the time of sentencing after revocation**

The basic procedure outlined above should have been followed when the original disposition was ordered in the sentence withheld – probation ordered case. If probation is revoked and an offender is returned to court for imposition of sentence, another sentence credit determination must be made. Three separate periods of time are relevant to the new sentence credit determination:

• Days in custody prior to original disposition – this finding should be the judgment of conviction entered at the time of original disposition;

• Days in custody after original disposition and through the date of probation revocation (for example, conditional jail time, holds, or sanction time) – this finding should be in the revocation order and warrant issued by the department or in the revocation summary provided by the department; and

• Days in custody after revocation, awaiting imposition of sentence – this finding must be made by the sentencing court.

1. **“Custody” during the period of probation**

Questions may arise about what constitutes “custody in connection with the course of conduct” in the sentence withheld case. These relate primarily to whether certain restrictive situations constitute “custody.” It is clear that time spent in jail awaiting revocation should be credited. But restrictions on an offender during the probationary period raise questions:

1. **Jail time as a condition of probation**

Section 973.155 is not explicit about whether sentence credit is required for time spent in the county jail as a condition of probation. However, the definition of “custody” under the escape statute expressly covers time spent in jail as a condition of probation.34 That means the offender was in custody while serving that condition time and is therefore entitled to credit for that time toward a sentence imposed after revocation of probation.

1. **Time in a treatment facility as a condition of probation**

If a probationer spent time in, for example, a drug treatment facility, he or she will be entitled to credit for that time if one of the following applies:

1. The person’s status was such that he or she was in “custody” under the standard discussed above in Section IV.A 1, because the offender was subject to an escape charge for leaving the status.

2. The treatment program is covered under § 973.155(1m) as discussed in Section

IV.A 2.

1. **Sentence credit in multiple sentence situations**

Proper determination of sentence credit can be complex in cases where several sentences are involved. The possible situations and relationships are endless.

Problems can be minimized if the court informs itself about the credit applicable to any previously imposed sentence and ensures that each judgment for the sentences it imposes has a finding of sentence credit. This can most easily be achieved by requiring the parties to come to court prepared to discuss and settle the sentence credit issue.

In light of the basic rule discussed above, in Section IV, the Committee recommends the following guiding principles in multiple sentence situations:

• When sentence A is to run concurrently with sentence B, the custody credited to sentence A must be factually connected to the course of conduct for which sentence A is imposed.

• When sentence A is to run consecutively to sentence B, the custody factually connected to sentence A is credited to the sentence only if the custody has not already been credited to sentence B. The aim is to credit the total sentence (consisting of all consecutive sentences put together) with one day for each day spent in custody without duplication of credit for time in custody in connection with more than one of the sentences.

1. **Concurrent sentences**

When concurrent sentences are imposed for offenses arising from the same course of conduct, sentence credit is to be determined as a total number of days and is to be credited against each sentence imposed. Credit against each sentence is required because credit against only one sentence would be negated by the concurrent sentence. Thus, if the credit was not awarded against both sentences, the offender would not receive the credit to which he is entitled.35

However, if concurrent sentences are imposed for offenses that do not arise out of the same course of conduct, the court must determine which sentence any specific period of time in custody should be credited against. As noted above in Section IV.B.2, as a general rule sentencing on one charge severs the connection between the custody and other pending charges. Thus, when custody is in connection with multiple, unrelated charges, credit should be granted on all concurrent sentences imposed for the charges up to the time the defendant begins serving one of the sentences. The amounts may not be equal. Also, the fact that concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time does not serve to transform custody connected to one case into custody connected to another case.36

Examples of concurrent sentence situations follow.

1. **Multiple counts in a single judgment**

Concurrent Sentence Example 1

Smith was arrested for two burglaries, charged in a two-count information, and convicted of both charges on the same day. He spent one year in jail awaiting disposition. He was sentenced to serve five years of imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently with one another.

The judgment of conviction should order that credit is due for 365 days pursuant to § 973.155.

When the judgment reaches the prison, the registrar will credit each of the concurrent sentences with 365 days, thus computing the sentences as though they had begun 365 days earlier.

1. **Sentences on unrelated charges for which different amounts of credit are due**

Concurrent Sentence Example 2

Johnson is arrested and charged with a burglary and remains in custody for 10 days before posting bail. He is later arrested for a new burglary and remains in custody, unable to post bail. 150 days after his second arrest, he is convicted of both charges and given two years of imprisonment on each count, concurrent.

The judgment of conviction on the first burglary should order that credit is due for 10 days, while the judgment for the second conviction should order 150 days of credit.

This illustrates one of those situations where the periods of time for which credit is due on unrelated concurrent sentences will not line up with each other. Some credit will be due on one sentence and a different amount of credit will be due on another.

In these cases, the registrars shall properly compute the credit ordered against each sentence. Taking the above example, if a defendant is entitled to 10 days of credit on one two-year sentence and 150 days of credit on a concurrent two-year sentence, the registrar will compute each sentence separately and the defendant’s controlling sentence will be the two-year sentence with the lesser amount of credit.

1. **A sentence imposed to run concurrently with a sentence imposed earlier**

In this situation, the determinative questions are the existence of a connection between any of the offender’s time in custody and the offense for which sentence is being imposed and, if there is a connection, whether it was ever “severed.”

Concurrent Sentence Example 3

Sauk County officials suspected Smith of committing an armed robbery in Sauk County and discover that he is serving a sentence in the Wisconsin State Prison on another charge. Sauk County filed a detainer at the prison. Six months later, Smith is convicted on the Sauk County charge and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 years, to run concurrently to the sentence he was already serving.

The judgment of conviction in Sauk County should indicate that Smith is entitled to no sentence credit under § 973.155. All the time Smith spent in custody after the filing of the Sauk County charge was spent in service of the previously imposed sentence on an unrelated charge. Thus, there was never a connection between the Sauk County case and Smith’s custody, so no additional credit is required.37

Concurrent Sentence Example 4

Smith is arrested and charged on the same day in two separate cases, A and B, each arising from a different course of conduct. Unable to post cash bail, he remains in custody. Ninety days after his arrest he is convicted and sentenced in Case A. Sixty days later he is convicted and sentenced in Case B. The sentence is ordered to run concurrently with the sentence in Case A.

The sentencing in Case A severed the connection between Smith’s custody and Case

B. Thus, his custody after the first 90 days was due solely to the sentence in Case A, and the judgment of conviction in Case B should give credit only for the first 90 days.38

Concurrent Sentence Example 5

Smith was convicted of burglary and sentenced to five years of imprisonment, but execution of the sentence was stayed and he was placed on probation. He committed another burglary while on probation and was taken into custody. A probation hold was imposed, and bail, which he could not post, was set on the new charge. He was convicted of the new charge and sentenced to five years of imprisonment, to run concurrently with the sentence underlying the probation, as probation had been revoked at the same time. He spent 180 days in custody.

The judgment of conviction on the new charge should order that credit be granted for 180 days spent in custody. The department’s revocation order should also reflect that 180 days credit is due on the sentence underlying the revoked probation.

When the judgment and the revocation order reach the prison, the registrar will credit each sentence with 180 days, by computing each sentence as though it had begun 180 days earlier.

(NOTE: This example assumes that no credit was due on the sentence underlying the probation for time spent in custody prior to the original sentencing on that charge. If such credit was due, it should be reflected on the original judgment of conviction and in the revocation order and would be credited by the registrar against only the first sentence.)

Concurrent Sentence Example 6

Smith was convicted of burglary; sentence was withheld and he was placed on probation. He committed another burglary while on probation and was taken into custody. A probation hold was imposed, and bail, which he could not post, was set on the new charge. His probation was revoked and after 180 days in custody he was sentenced after revocation to four years of imprisonment. Ninety days later he was convicted of the new burglary charge and sentenced to four years of imprisonment, to run concurrently with the four-year sentence imposed for the first burglary.

The judgment of conviction on the new burglary charge should order that credit be granted for 180 days spent in custody before being sentenced after revocation for the first burglary. Smith is not entitled to the additional 90 days he was in custody after the sentencing in the first case because that sentencing severed the connection between his custody and the new charge.39

While the credit on each judgment will be equal, the second sentence will control Smith’s release date because as of the date of sentencing in the second case, he had served 90 more days of the first sentence.

(NOTE: This example also assumes that no credit was due on the sentence underlying the probation for time spent in custody prior to the original sentencing on that charge. If such credit was due, it should be reflected on the original judgment of conviction and in the revocation order and would be credited by the registrar against only the first sentence.)

Concurrent Sentence Example 7

While Smith is on extended supervision he is arrested for a new offense. He is held in custody on an ES hold and on cash bail on the new offense. Three months after his arrest his ES is revoked, and a month after revocation, he is returned to the prison system to commence reconfinement time. Two months after being returned to prison he is convicted and sentenced for the new offense and given a concurrent sentence.

The offender’s custody was connected to both the ES case and the new offense until the time he was returned to prison. The return to prison severed the connection between the offender’s custody and the new offense. Because the sentence for the new offense is concurrent, however, the offender is entitled to credit toward that sentence for the time between his arrest and his return to prison.40

Whether an offender subject to multiple charges or revocations awaits resolution of pending matters in jail or prison, whether cases are resolved at the same time or at wide intervals, or whether one case or the other is first resolved is often fortuitous. Practices differ from county to county, based on local court calendars, whether the offender will waive revocation or plead guilty, and even whether the local detention facility has available space.41 These practices may result in disparate results in similar cases or may allow “persons to manipulate the system to their advantage” (as by delaying the revocation of probation, parole, or extended supervision).42 Trial courts should be as fully informed as possible about each case so that unfair results can be avoided. If different judges are involved, it will be unlikely that each judge will be aware of the sentence credit situation in the other case when completing his or her own judgment, but the judge imposing the second sentence should try to become informed of the credit awarded against the first sentence.

1. **Concurrent sentences imposed after revocation of probation and revocation of a deferred entry of judgment agreement**

Concurrent Sentence Example 8

Smith is arrested and charged with a felony and two misdemeanors arising out of the same course of conduct. He is placed on probation for the misdemeanors and is subject to a deferred entry of judgment agreement on the felony, and is free on bond with respect to the felony. He is later taken into custody and placed on a probation hold, and both probation and the deferred entry of judgment agreement are revoked. After being in custody for 75 days on the hold and while awaiting revocation of probation, he is sentenced after revocation on the misdemeanors and sentenced on the felony. The court imposes concurrent sentences on all three counts.

The judgment of conviction should indicate that Smith is entitled to 75 days of credit on all three sentences even though he was not on probation for the felony because the custody was in connection for the course of conduct for which all three sentences were imposed.43

Note that if the felony arose from a course of conduct different from that of the misdemeanors, the custody for any probation hold, or while awaiting probation, revocation would not be connected to the felony unless the bond on the felony was revoked or amended in a way that also kept the person in custody.

1. **Consecutive sentences**

The objective with consecutive sentences is to assure that credit is awarded against one, but only one, of the consecutive sentences.44 In situations where consecutive sentences are imposed by different judges, there will have to be some communication between the two courts to assure that sentence credit is properly ordered. This can most easily be achieved by requiring the parties to come to the sentencing hearing prepared to identify any sentence credit awarded on any previously imposed sentences.

Examples of common consecutive sentence situations follow.

1. **Multiple counts in a single judgment**

Consecutive Sentence Example 1

Smith was arrested for two armed robberies, charged in a two-count information, and convicted of both charges on the same day. He spent one year in jail awaiting disposition. He is sentenced to serve 10 years of imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run consecutively to one another. The judgment of conviction should order that 365 days credit be granted.

If an offender with multiple charges is entitled to credit that is applicable to all of the charges and is given an imposed sentence on one charge and a consecutive imposed and stayed sentence on the others, the credit must be awarded against the first imposed sentence.45

1. **Sentence to run consecutively to a sentence imposed by another court**

Consecutive Sentence Example 2

Smith is arrested for an armed robbery in Dane County. An armed robbery charge is already pending in Sauk County, but Smith had been released on bail. He spends one year in Dane County jail awaiting trial and is then convicted and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, with sentence credit ordered for the one year he spent in jail. He pleads guilty to the Sauk County charge and is sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the Dane County charge. Sauk County had lodged a detainer against Smith in Dane County.

The Dane County judgment should order that credit be granted for the 365 days spent in Dane County jail. When the sentencing takes place in Sauk County, the judge must be informed of the sentence and sentence credit ordered in the Dane County judgment. This should be done by the parties, who should come to the Sauk County sentencing prepared to address the sentence credit issue, ideally with a copy of the Dane County judgment.

The Sauk County judge would not order credit for the time spent in custody in Dane County, even though that custody may have been due in part to the Sauk County detainer, because the detainer is insufficient to establish a connection between the Dane County custody and the Sauk County case.46 When the defendant reaches the institution, his total sentence will be computed as though it had begun 365 days earlier.

(NOTE: There may be other periods of custody allocable solely to the Sauk County case for which credit may be due in the Sauk County judgment.)

1. **Multiple sentences with differing amounts of credit**

Consecutive Sentence Example 3

Roberts is arrested for a theft and, after remaining in custody for 30 days, is released on bail. He is later arrested for a burglary and remains in custody until he is sentenced in both cases 60 days later. He is sentenced to two years of imprisonment for the theft and six years of imprisonment for the burglary, to run consecutively to the theft sentence.

The judgment of conviction for the theft conviction should include 30 days of sentence credit, while the judgment of conviction for the burglary conviction should order 60 days of sentence credit. Thus, the total consecutive sentences of eight years are reduced by the total of 90 days Roberts spent in custody before sentencing on the two cases.

1. **Sentence to run consecutively to a sentence imposed following revocation of probation**

Consecutive Sentence Example 4

Smith was convicted of armed robbery in 2010 and placed on probation; sentence was withheld. He was entitled to no sentence credit as a result of that episode. In 2011, he commits another armed robbery. A probation hold is filed against him and he is charged with the new offense. He spends one year in jail awaiting trial and revocation. He is sentenced on the new charge first and receives a 10-year sentence, with credit ordered for the one year. He then comes before the judge who imposed the original probation. A 10-year consecutive sentence is imposed.

The judgment imposed first should order credit for the one year spent in custody. The judge imposing the sentence following revocation of probation must be informed about the sentence and sentence credit ordered in the first judgment and should order no credit for time spent in custody that was awarded as credit on the first judgment.

(NOTE: If Smith had received an imposed and stayed sentence originally, or was on parole or extended supervision, the Department of Corrections would give credit on the stayed sentence or the sentence for which Smith was on parole or extended supervision for all time in custody on the new offense until the person is received at or returned to prison. Thus, in these circumstances, the judge who imposes a consecutive sentence on the new offense (which was the basis for revoking probation, parole, or extended supervision) should not grant credit for any custody on the new offense.47)

1. **Correcting Sentence Credit Errors**48
2. Since the effective date of § 973.155 in 1978, it has been required that the sentence credit determination be made part of the judgment of conviction as a finding by the court. As stressed above in Section III.A., judicial time and energy may be saved if courts require accurate information at the time of sentencing and impress upon the parties the importance of making the credit determination at that time. Even when this is done, however, the credit determination may turn out to be wrong and need correction. Correcting an erroneous credit determination is required even if the defendant stipulated to that determination. State v. Kontny, 2020 WI App 30, 392 Wis.2d 311, ¶¶7-9, 943 N.W.2d 923. See also, State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88, 400 Wis. 2d 93, 968 N.W.2d 93.

If a determination was not made in the judgment, past practice has been to first petition the Department of Corrections for credit. When a determination has been made part of the judgment, any change in that determination requires an amendment of the judgment. While administrative change of the sentence credit finding might be more convenient, a finding in a judgment simply may not be amended by administrative action.

In cases where court action is required to correct a judgment, the correction process can be simple and efficient. A number of different procedural designations could be applied to the request for correction. Regardless of how the request is categorized, it should follow the general format described below.

1. An application to correct the sentence credit determination should be made in the sentencing court.

2. The application should specify the additional credit that is being requested – e.g., to change the sentence credit determination from 50 to 75 days.

1. The application should specify the nature of each separate period of custody for which credit is being claimed – e.g., 10 days in the Wood County jail after arrest and before transfer to Dodge County; 15 days in a mental health facility while competency to stand trial was being evaluated.
2. The application should identify the reason for each period of custody and must show that it was “connected with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.”
3. Attached to the application should be confirmation by the person having custody of the offender for each period which verifies both the duration and the reason for the custody.
4. A copy of the application should be sent to the district attorney.
5. A hearing is not required but may be ordered in the discretion of the court.
6. If the sentence credit determination is corrected, an amended judgment should be prepared which reflects the proper sentence credit. The amended judgment should be promptly sent to the institution having custody of the offender.

It may happen that an error in the initial determination of sentence credit is not discovered and corrected until after an offender has served the custody portion of the sentence and has been released on parole or extended supervision. The judgment of conviction should still be amended because the additional credit reduces the offender’s sentence and, therefore, the amount of time remaining on parole or extended supervision. The amended judgment should be sent to the records office of the Department of Corrections’ Division of Community Corrections, which is responsible for supervision of offenders on parole or extended supervision.

The judgment should also be amended even if the error is not discovered and corrected until after the offender’s parole or extended supervision has been revoked and the offender reincarcerated under § 302.11(7) or reconfined under § 302.113(9). The additional credit must be applied to reduce the length of reincarceration or reconfinement the offender serves as well as the total length of the remaining sentence.49

1. If the application to correct the sentence credit determination is denied, an order to that effect should be entered, and a copy sent to the person who filed the application.

Circuit courts are sometimes asked to address sentence credit requests made by offenders who were sentenced in Wisconsin and later transferred to other jurisdictions—for instance, due to a warrant or detainer. The basic rule described above also applies to these cases: To be granted credit, the offender must have been in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed.50

That the offender was in custody is typically not disputed in these cases. Instead, the issue is whether that custody was in connection with the Wisconsin case. Because the basic rule of § 973.155 applies, whether an offender sentenced Wisconsin who is made available to another jurisdiction remains in custody in connection with the Wisconsin case will depend on whether an event in the other jurisdiction severs the connection between custody and the Wisconsin case. The event that will most likely sever the connection will be the imposition of a sentence in the other jurisdiction, though, as in Wisconsin, the nature of the sentence imposed in the other jurisdiction will affect the offender’s entitlement to credit.51

Determining credit in these situations will therefore require obtaining as much information as possible about not only the amount time the offender was in custody, but also the reasons for the offender’s transfer to the other jurisdiction, the nature and disposition of the proceedings in that jurisdiction, when any sentence was imposed, whether the sentence was consecutive or concurrent, and whether credit was given in the other jurisdiction.

**COMMENT**

SM-34A was originally published in 1982 and revised in 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995, 2013, 2016, 2018, 2019, 2021, and 2023. This revision was approved by the Committee in October 2023; added to the comment.

1. State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶51, 327 Wis.2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (quoting State v. Ward, 153 Wis.2d 743, 745, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989), and State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 379, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985)). Also see, State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, ¶23, 363 Wis.2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387.
2. The exception is that when a court imposing a life sentence establishes a specific date for parole eligibility under § 973.014(1)(b), time spent in custody prior to sentencing is not credited against that parole eligibility date. State v. Chapman, 175 Wis.2d 231, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1993). While the court may consider the amount of credit as a factor in setting the eligibility date, the date set by the court governs. State v. Seeley, 212 Wis.2d 75, 83-88, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1997).

Section 973.014(1)(b) applies only to offenses committed before December 31, 1999, when Truth-in- Sentencing took effect. However, the Truth-in-Sentencing legislation created § 973.014(1g)(a)2., which allows a court imposing a life sentence for an offense committed on or after December 31, 1999, to set a date on which the person is eligible to petition for supervised release under § 302.114(5). No published decision has addressed whether time spent in custody before sentencing should be credited against the extended supervision eligibility date set by a court, but the Committee concludes that under the rationales of Chapman and Seeley the time in custody would not be credited.

3. State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, ¶23, 363 Wis.2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387.

4. State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis.2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995).

1. Note that the statute qualifies this listing of three periods of time with the phrase “without limitation by enumeration.” Thus, periods of time not listed may be creditable under § 973.155.
2. As noted in Section VI, a defendant’s stipulation to a specific amount of credit does not prevent the defendant from seeking additional credit in a subsequent motion. State v. Kontny, 2020 WI App 30, ¶¶7-9, 392 Wis. 2d 311, 943 N.W.2d 923. See also State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88, 400 Wis. 2d 93, 968 N.W.2d 740.
3. In State v. Walker, 117 Wis.2d 579, 345 N.W.2d 413 (1984), the Wisconsin Supreme Court identified the procedure that should be followed: The appropriate sentence is to be determined independently of any time previously served; only then should sentence credit be determined. For a more complete discussion see note 15, SM-34, Sentencing Procedure, Standards, And Special Issues (© 1999).

The awarding of sentence credit is a judicial function that requires a court to reach its own conclusion about the amount of sentence credit to be awarded and to explain its findings and reasoning on the record. While the court may seek assistance from its court clerk in collecting information that may be relevant to the credit determination, the awarding or denial of sentence credit is the duty of the court, not the court clerk. State v. Kitt, 2015 WI App 9, 359 Wis.2d 592, 859 N.W.2d 164.

1. Section 973.03(4)(b) expressly provides for sentence credit for periods of home detention.
2. In State v. Avila, 192 Wis.2d 870, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the claim that principles of equal protection require that a period of jail time ordered as a condition of probation be reduced to reflect time spent in jail prior to trial because of indigency. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that his condition of probation jail time should be credited for prison time served pursuant to a conviction later reversed. The court held that the applicable statute, § 973.04, applied only to credit against subsequent “sentences” and that jail time as a condition of probation is not a sentence. Avila did not involve a claim that § 973.155 applied, but the same result should follow: that statute also requires credit only against “sentences”; time in jail ordered as a condition of probation is not a “sentence.”
3. State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, ¶24, 363 Wis.2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387.
4. State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis. 2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655. See also§ 973.155(3) (computing custody as if it were served time in the institution to which the defendant has been sentenced).
5. State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, ¶¶16-29, 274 Wis.2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914, held that a person detained or committed under Chapter 980 is not in “custody” for purposes of § 973.155. In 2005 Wis. Act 434, § 45, however, the definition of “custody” under the escape statute was amended to cover detention under Chapter 980. See § 946.42(1)(a)1.a. and 1.e. (referring to facilities under §§ 980.04(1) and 980.065 and to supervised release under Chapter 980). The amendments to § 946.42(1)(a) took effect August 1, 2006. Thus, as of that date, a person detained or committed under Chapter 980 is in “custody” for purposes of § 973.155, effectively superseding Thorson’s holding to the contrary. Note, however, that Thorson also held a person’s custody under Chapter 980 is not “in connection with” the predicate offense for the commitment; that holding is not changed by the amendments to the definition of “custody” in § 946.42. See note 25, below.
6. Credit is to be granted for time spent in jail as a condition of probation based both on the holding in State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis.2d 371, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983), and on the fact that 1995 Wis. Act 154 amended the definition of “custody” in § 946.42(1)(a) to include custody in jail as a condition of probation. As to bail release, note that §§ 969.02(3)(d) and 969.03(1)(e) allow a court to set a condition of bail release that requires a defendant to return to custody after specified hours.
7. Credit should be granted when, for example, a Wisconsin offender is arrested in Illinois on a Wisconsin warrant even if the offender is also being held on Illinois charges, unless or until the offender begins serving a sentence on the Illinois charges. State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶¶31-40, 58-72, 82, 327 Wis.2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516. Credit should not be granted when a Wisconsin offender, already in custody on Illinois charges, has a Wisconsin “hold” or detainer filed against him. This is consistent with the conclusion that filing a detainer against one already in custody in Wisconsin does not result in “custody” under § 973.155 on the charge which is the subject of the detainer. See note 27, below.

A prior version of SM-34A (© 1995) stated that a person was in “custody” in another state only if his or her custody was based exclusively on a Wisconsin warrant. This conclusion was rejected in State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶¶11-25, 306 Wis.2d 450, 743 N.W.2d 700, aff’d, 2010 WI 77, ¶40, 327 Wis.2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516, and was removed in the 2014 version of SM-34A.

1. State v. Baker, 179 Wis.2d 655, 508 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1993).
2. State v. Sevelin, 204 Wis.2d 127, 554 N.W.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1996). Credit is not required where jail time as a condition of probation is stayed and the person is hospitalized for treatment. State v. Edwards, 2003 WI App 221, 267 Wis.2d 491, 671 N.W.2d 371.

17. A person required to remain in his home during all nonworking hours as a condition of bail pending appeal, is not entitled to credit for the period of home detention on the sentence imposed after the appeal was decided. State v. Pettis, 149 Wis.2d 207, 441 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1989).

18. See the discussion of State v. Cobb, 135 Wis.2d 181, 400 N.W.2d 9 (Ct. App. 1986). In Cobb, the court held that credit was properly denied to a probationer who was ordered, as a condition of probation, to spend either one year in jail or go to a drug abuse treatment center. He chose to participate in a drug treatment program and successfully completed it. When his probation was revoked, he sought credit for the time her spent in the program. The court held that credit was not required because there was no evidence of “custody” – defining that term, by reference to the escape statute, as “physical detention by an institution, institution guard or peace officer.” 135 Wis.2d 181, 185. As discussed above in Section IV.A.1 and 2, after Cobb was decided the supreme court clarified that for purposes of sentence credit “custody” is defined not solely by physical detention, but by whether the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving whatever status or setting her or she was in. Magnuson, 233 Wis.2d 40, ¶31.

19. In State v. Harris, 168 Wis.2d 168, 483 N.W.2d 808 (Ct. App. 1992), the court held that there was no authority to grant credit for time served in a home detention program ordered under the auspices of a federal consent decree.

20. State ex rel. Simpson v. Schwarz, 2002 WI App 7, 250 Wis.2d 214, 640 N.W.2d 527.

21. State v Friedlander, 2019 WI 22, 385 Wis. 2d 612, 923 N.W.2d 849. Friedlander sought credit for time he spent in the community after he was released from a prison sentence when he should instead haven been transferred to a county jail to serve time as a condition of probation in another case. The court of appeals concluded that Friedlander was entitled to credit for the time he was in the community through no fault of his own, citing State v. Riske, 152 Wis. 2d 260, 448 N.W.2d 260 (1989), and State v. Dentici, 2002 WI App 77, 251 Wis. 2d 436, 643 N.W. 2d 180. Riske and Dentici held that a defendant who reported to jail to serve a sentence but was turned away due to overcrowding was entitled to credit for the time he was at liberty. The decisions adopted an equitable doctrine recognized in other jurisdictions that a person erroneously released from custody continues to serve his or her sentence.

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ grant of credit to Friedlander and overruled Riske and Dentici. The supreme court concluded that Riske and Dentici are inconsistent with the bright-line rule that a person must be subject to an escape charge to be in “custody” for the purposes of § 973.155. Under that rule, it is irrelevant to a sentence credit determination that a person at liberty through no fault of his or her own. Friedlander, 385 Wis. 2d 612, ¶¶24-42.

22. A defendant held “in part” on unsatisfied cash bail on the principal charge and an unrelated charge was in custody in connection with the principal charge up until disposition of the unrelated charge. State v. Harr, 211 Wis.2d 584, 596-97, 568 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1997). Harr applied State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis.2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing a prior version of SM-34A) and State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (approving the reasoning in Gavigan).

In some cases a person facing multiple charges arising out of the same course of conduct may be placed on probation for some of the charges and be subject to deferred entry of judgment agreement on other of the charges. If the person is taken into custody on a probation hold, that custody is also considered to be in connection with the charge that is subject to the deferred entry of judgment agreement. State v. Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57, ¶¶13-17, 389 Wis. 2d 69, 934 N.W.2d 905.

See also State v. (Elandis) Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶27, 318 Wis.2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207 (in deciding whether an offender is entitled to credit under § 973.155, the court must determine whether the person was in custody and “whether all or part of the ‘custody’ for which credit is sought was ‘in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed’”); State v. Hintz, 2007 WI App 113, ¶8, 300 Wis.2d 583, 731 N.W.2d 646 (credit must be awarded under § 973.155(1)(b) for time in custody on an extended supervision hold if the hold was “at least in part” due to the conduct resulting in the new conviction); State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 59, 399 Wis. 2d 165, 963 N.W.2d 927 (credit must be awarded under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) toward a state criminal sentence for time in custody on a federal supervision hold if the hold was due in part to the conduct resulting in the state sentence). Cf. State v. Thompson, 225 Wis.2d 578, 593 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999) (offender was in custody in connection with an adult charge while confined under a juvenile commitment because the adult charge led to revocation of juvenile supervision and confinement in juvenile facility).

In State v. (Marcus) Johnson, 2007 WI 107, 304 Wis.2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505, the defendant argued for a broad interpretation of the “in connection with” language in § 973.155 based in part on the statement in the paragraph to which this note is appended that custody “must be, at least in part, the result of a legal status . . . stemming from the course of conduct for which sentence is being imposed.” Id., ¶68. The supreme court rejected Johnson’s “expansive interpretation” as contrary to applicable case law, in particular State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985), where, once the offender began serving a sentence on one charge, it was irrelevant that he was also awaiting trial on another charge. Id., ¶69. Because SM-34A discusses and incorporates the holdings of the applicable case law, including Beets, the Committee concluded the court’s rejection of Johnson’s argument did not require a revision of the language of SM-34A.

23. State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis.2d 492, 498, 561 N.W.2d 749; (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶¶15-17, 232 Wis.2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; State v. (Elandis) Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶33, 318 Wis.2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207; State v. Harrison, 2020 WI 35, ¶¶36-46, 391 Wis. 2d 161, 942 N.W.2d 310 (holding that the sentences the defendant was serving consecutively to previously imposed sentences in other cases were not factually connected to the course of conduct for which the previous sentences were imposed; thus, when the consecutive sentences were vacated, the defendant was not entitled to have the time in custody on the vacated consecutive sentences credited toward the previously imposed sentences); State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶¶29-32, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605 (where an offender previously sentenced in Wisconsin is serving a sentence in another state is returned to Wisconsin to address new, unrelated Wisconsin cases or offenses, his custody here was not factually connected with his Wisconsin sentences and was not entitled to credit on his Wisconsin sentences for time in custody back in Wisconsin). See also State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, ¶34, 274 Wis.2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914, which held that time spent in the Wisconsin Resource Center pending a Chapter 980 commitment trial is not “in connection with” the sentence on a criminal offense that served as one of the predicates for the Chapter 980 petition.

24. State v. (Elandis) Johnson, 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis.2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207. See also note 36, below.

25. “Custody” as used in § 973.155 must result “from the occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority which occasions, or is related to, confinement on the charge for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced.” State v. Demars, 119 Wis.2d 19, 26, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984) (communication of a detainer which carried no custodial mandate was not sufficient to establish connection with the case in which the detainer was filed); State v. Nyborg, 122 Wis.2d 765, 768, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis.2d 141, 147-48, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (entry in a jail log indicating an outstanding arrest warrant from another county was not “occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority” sufficient to establish connection between basis for custody and charges for which warrant was issued). Cf. State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, ¶¶14-18, 306 Wis.2d 450, 743 N.W.2d 700, aff’d as modified as to number of days of credit granted, 2010 WI 77, ¶¶9, 33-34, 81-82, 327 Wis.2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (arrest of defendant in Illinois on Wisconsin warrant established a connection between custody and Wisconsin course of conduct).

26. State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis.2d 389, 393, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing a prior version of SM-34A). The reasoning in Gavigan was approved by the supreme court in State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 380-81, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985). See also State v. Carter, 2010 WI 77, ¶37, 327 Wis.2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (“once a defendant is actually serving the sentence on a charge, the defendant is not entitled to credit for presentence custody toward sentences on unrelated charges, although trial may be pending on the separate charges at the time the defendant is serving the first sentence.”). See also State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶¶29-32, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605 (where an offender previously sentenced in Wisconsin is serving a sentence in another state is returned to Wisconsin to address new, unrelated Wisconsin cases or offenses, his custody here was not factually connected with his Wisconsin sentences and was not entitled to credit on his Wisconsin sentences for time in custody back in Wisconsin).

27. An offender’s custody may preclude establishment of a connection with a course of conduct even if the custody is not due to service of a criminal sentence. In State v. Riley, 175 Wis.2d 214, 498 N.W.2d 884 (Ct. App. 1993), the defendant escaped from jail confinement ordered as a condition of probation. He was eventually arrested after committing a new crime during the period of escape. He was returned to jail to continue serving the original condition-of-probation confinement and cash bail was set on the new charge, which Riley did not post. At the completion of the condition of probation confinement, Riley was sentenced on the new charge. The court of appeals held that credit for the time spent in jail as a condition of the original probation was not due against the new sentence because § 973.155 “does not authorize credit for a term of confinement ordered [as a consequence] for prior criminal activity irrespective of whether that confinement is a condition of probation or as the result of a sentence after revocation of probation.” Id., 220-21, citing State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985). See also State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis.2d 141, 144-46, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (applying Riley to similar facts).

Further, a defendant already in custody under a juvenile commitment was not entitled to credit toward an adult battery charge he committed while confined in a juvenile correctional institution based on a previous unrelated delinquency adjudication. State v. (Marcus) Johnson, 2007 WI 107, 304 Wis.2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505. Because Johnson’s juvenile commitment order pre-existed the battery charge, it precluded the creation of a connection between Johnson’s custody and the battery charge. Id., ¶63. Nor was a connection created when Johnson’s commitment was later extended based in part on the conduct giving rise to the battery charge because, the court concluded, the commitment would have been extended even if the battery had not occurred. Id., ¶71. The court distinguished State v. Thompson, 225 Wis.2d 578, 593 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999), [cited above, in note 22,] on the grounds that Thompson’s custody was both connected to the new charge, which had been a basis for the revocation of juvenile supervision, and was for treatment in the juvenile system, not continuing punishment of the original offense. Id., ¶¶45-55.

Note, however, that custody under a civil commitment for contempt does not preclude a connection between the custody and a pending criminal charge. Unlike a person serving a sentence, as in Beets, jail time as a condition of probation, as in Riley, or a juvenile commitment, as in (Marcus) Johnson, a person confined under a civil contempt commitment would not necessarily be in custody absent the pending criminal charge because the person may obtain release by meeting the contempt commitment’s purge conditions. State v. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105, ¶¶20-21, 357 Wis.2d 662, 855 N.W.2d 465.

28. In State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis.2d 492, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997), the defendant posted a personal recognizance bond on a sexual assault charge and remained on that bond until his sentencing. He was, however, held in custody on cash bond on later charges of bail jumping based on violations of the recognizance bond in the sexual assault case. He was sentenced to prison on the sexual assault charge; his sentence on the bail jumping charge was imposed and stayed and he was placed on probation, to run consecutively to the prison sentence for sexual assault. The court of appeals concluded Beiersdorf was in custody only “in connection with” the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed and stayed. Thus, no credit is due on the prison sentence for sexual assault.

29. State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis.2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) (discussed in detail in note 34, below); State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (discussed in detail in note 39, below). While sentencing on one charge may be the most common event that will sever the connection, it is not the only one. In State v. Harr, 211 Wis.2d 584, 596, 568 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1997), the court concluded that the offender’s commitment under § 971.17 after being found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect severed the connection between his custody and an unrelated pending charge.

Not every event that creates an independent basis for legal custody “severs” the connection between an offender’s custody and a pending criminal case. To sever the connection, the event must have put the offender in a status that would keep the offender in custody even in the absence of the criminal case. For instance, in State v. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105, 357 Wis.2d 662, 855 N.W.2d 465, an offender who was already in custody on cash bail in a criminal case was found in contempt for failing to pay a fine in an unrelated case and ordered to be held in custody under the contempt order unless he met the purge condition. The subsequent contempt order did not sever the connection between the custody and the criminal case because, unlike the offender in Beets, who would have been in custody under the sentence imposed even in the absence of the pending criminal case, Trepanier could have obtained release from the contempt order by satisfying the purge conditions. Id., ¶¶15-21.

In addition, being on bond on a charge that is subject to a deferred entry of judgment agreement does not “sever” the connection between that count and other counts in the case for which the person is placed on probation. State v. Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57, ¶¶18-28, 389 Wis. 2d 69, 934 N.W.2d 905.

30. State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88, 400 Wis. 2d 93, 698 N.W.2d 740 (citing Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2)(b) governing imposed and stayed sentences); State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis. 2d 734, 715 N.W.2d 713, and State v. Davis, 2017 WI App 55, 377 Wis. 2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488 (citing Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4) governing persons revoked from parole or extended supervision).

31. State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, ¶32, 232 Wis.2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155. The court in Floyd disclaimed reliance on the “in connection with the course of conduct” language in § 973.155 and instead relied on the phrase “related to an offense for which sentence was imposed,” finding the unique nature of read-in offenses made them “related” to offenses for which a defendant is sentenced for purposes of § 973.155(1).

Floyd limits its holding to offenses that are “read in” for sentencing purposes. 232 Wis.2d 767, ¶30. Thus, Floyd does not require credit to be given for custody related to every offense that a judge “considers” at sentencing. See State v. Piggue, 2016 WI App 13, 366 Wis.2d 605, 875 N.W.2d 663. In Piggue, the defendant was in custody on a sexual assault charge when he tried to persuade the victim not to testify against him. He was acquitted of the sexual assault, but was then charged with and convicted of witness intimidation. The judge considered the sexual assault allegations when sentencing Piggue on the intimidation charge, so Piggue argued that Floyd required the time he spent in custody on the sexual assault charges to be credited toward the intimidation sentence. The court of appeals held that Floyd should not be extended beyond its express limitation to “read-in” offenses. 366 Wis.2d 605, ¶¶12-13.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reaffirmed Floyd in State v. Fermanich, 2023 WI 48, 407 Wis.2d 693, 991 N.W.2d 340. In Fermanich, the defendant was arrested in Oneida County after stealing three trucks in Langlade County within a span of two hours. Fermanich remained in custody in Oneida County due to his inability to post cash bail, during which time additional charges were filed against him in Langlade County, where he was granted a signature bond. Subsequently, the cases from both counties were consolidated, and Fermanich pleaded guilty to one charge from Langlade County and two from Oneida County, leading to the dismissal of all other charges. Upon violating the terms of his probation, Fermanich was sentenced to 18 months of initial confinement. Applying Floyd, the Supreme Court ruled that Fermanich should receive 433 days of sentence credit for the time he spent in custody related to the Oneida County charges, which were dismissed and read-in, but still considered alongside the Langlade County charge for which the circuit court ultimately sentenced him. Id. at ¶16.

32. As noted above, in Section IV.B.2 of this Special Material, once a person begins serving one of the sentences, his “custody” is no longer “in connection with” the other pending charge. Credit on the sentence for that pending charge will be due only for the days when both charges were pending, prior to the commencement of the other sentence. State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 352 (1985). For cases applying Beets to offenders who are revoked from extended supervision for new charges and given a sentence on the new charges concurrent to the sentence on which supervision was revoked, see State v. Hintz, 2007 WI App 113, 300 Wis.2d 583, 731 N.W.2d 646; State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis.2d 734, 715 N.W.2D 713; and State v. Davis, 2017 WI App 55, 377 Wis.2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488. For a case applying Beets to an offender who was on probation with an imposed and stayed sentence and whose probation was revoked for new charges for which he received a concurrent sentence, see State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88, 400 Wis. 2d 93, 698 N.W.2d 740.This situation is discussed below, Section V.C.1.c, this Special Material. For a discussion of credit in consecutive sentence situations, see below, Section V.C. (intro.) and 2, this Special Material.

33. The defendant in Tuescher won a new trial on an attempted homicide charge arising out of an incident involving a burglary and shooting. The attempted homicide conviction was reversed, and while it was being relitigated he remained in custody serving the sentences imposed for two other charges arising out of the incident. After he was convicted and sentenced again on the attempted homicide, Tuescher sought credit toward the new sentence for his time in custody between winning the new trial and being resentenced. The defendant was not entitled to the credit because during that time he was serving the sentences imposed on the charges which were not retried. 226 Wis.2d 465, 467.

34. See Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a)1.h., and State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis.2d 371, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983). The question of credit for time spent in jail as a condition of probation was an open one at the time SM-34A was originally published. That version recommended that credit be granted for such time. The Committee’s conclusion was adopted in Gilbert, which held that the plain meaning of § 973.155 required that credit be given: “there is no basis for interpreting the statute as excluding custody as a condition of probation from the statute’s coverage.” 115 Wis.2d 371, 377.

Because jail time as a condition of probation is not a sentence, any “good time” the circuit court allowed the offender to earn while serving the conditional jail time is not eligible for sentence credit under 973.155(4); that statute provides for sentence credit to include “good time” only for sentences of one year or less. State ex rel Baade v. Hayes, 2015 WI App 71, 365 Wis.2d 174, 870 N.W.2d 478.

35. This principle was cited with approval and applied in State v. Ward, 153 Wis.2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989).

36. State v. (Elandis) Johnson , 2009 WI 57, ¶¶50-60, 318 Wis.2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207, criticized a prior version of SM-34A (© 1995) that referred to crediting equally all concurrent sentences “imposed at the same time or for offenses arising from the same course of conduct.” The court found this formulation “unfortunate” because it was “too broad” and had led to the belief that when concurrent sentences are imposed at the same time, any credit is to be applied against each of the sentences imposed regardless of whether the custody was factually connected to each sentence. Noting that the “unfortunate” passage was more understandable, if still inaccurate, when read in context with the examples in the Special Material, the court made it clear that any custody applied to any given sentence must also be factually connected to that sentence. Id., ¶¶61-68. As applied to Johnson’s case, the court held:

¶47 Calculating the correct number of days that need to be credited to each of Johnson’s concurrent sentences requires that we examine separately each sentence and the time spent in presentence custody “in connection with” each sentence. We cannot, as Johnson’s argument attempts to do, conflate all the concurrent sentences imposed on the same day and make a credit determination as if there were only one overall sentence imposed.

The language criticized in (Elandis) Johnson was removed in the 2014 version of SM-34A.

37. When credit has been granted against an earlier sentence which was completely served before sentencing on a new offense, no credit against the new sentence is required. State v. Morrick, 147 Wis.2d 185, 432 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Amos, 153 Wis.2d 257, 280, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Jackson, 2000 WI App 41, ¶19, 233 Wis.2d 231, 607 N.W.2d 338.

See also State v. Rohl, 160 Wis.2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991) (defendant not entitled to credit for time served in California while he was on Wisconsin parole because he had received full credit for the time toward the sentence he completed in California); State v. Martinez, 2007 WI App 225, 305 Wis.2d 753, 741 N.W.2d 280 (reaching the same conclusion with respect to time served in a federal institution); State v. Coles, 208 Wis.2d 328, 559 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1997) (a defendant who was sentenced on one count to a “time served” sentence that used all his pretrial credit was not entitled to any of that credit toward a sentence on a second count because the sentence on the second count was effectively consecutive).

38. State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis.2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984). Gavigan committed a robbery on September 15, 1982. About 24 hours later, he led police on a high speed chase that resulted in a charge of fleeing an officer. Thirty-nine days after his arrest, he pleaded guilty to the fleeing charge and was sentenced to six months in jail. One hundred and seven days later Gavigan was sentenced on the robbery – a three-year sentence to run concurrently with the six-month sentence on the misdemeanor. The trial judge gave 39 days credit on the three-year sentence.

Gavigan claimed he should also receive credit for the 107 days that followed the misdemeanor sentence but preceded the robbery sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of credit for the 107 days, holding that the custody was not “in connection with” the robbery charge – it was attributable solely to the misdemeanor conviction.

39. See State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 352 (1985). Beets was convicted of drug offenses and placed on probation with sentence withheld. He was arrested on a burglary charge and held in custody for that charge. Within a few days, a probation hold was added. The hold was based on the burglary charge.

Seventy-eight days after his arrest, Beets’ probation was revoked and two concurrent three-year sentences were imposed. He received credit for the 78 days and went to prison.

One hundred and ninety-two days after his prison sentence began, Beets was sentenced on the burglary. He received a three-year sentence concurrent with the sentence he was already serving. He received 78 days credit for the time spent in custody before the first sentence was imposed (when both the revocation and the burglary charge were pending).

Beets sought credit for the 192 days that elapsed after his first prison sentence began, while the burglary charge was pending.

The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of credit, holding that confinement after the first sentence was imposed could not be “in connection with” the pending burglary charge. Thus, § 973.155 does not require credit, because the charges resulting in the first sentence and the pending charges were not “related.” The court stated that “unless the acts for which the first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection between the custody and the pending charges.” Id., 383.

The rule in Beets that sentencing on a related charge “severs the connection” was applied in State v. Abbott, 207 Wis.2d 624, 558 N.W.2d 927 (Ct. App. 1996). Abbott committed a battery while serving a sentence under the Division of Intensive Sanctions (DIS) program. He received a sanction of 89 days in jail. Later, he pled guilty to the battery and was sentenced. The court of appeals held Abbott was not entitled to credit on the battery sentence for time spent in jail for the DIS sanction. Any connection between the two sentences was severed when Abbott began serving the DIS sanction. See also State v. Hintz, 2007 WI App 113, ¶7 n.3, 300 Wis.2d 583, 731 N.W.2d 646 (applying Beets to offender revoked from extended supervision for new charges and given a sentence on new charges concurrent to sentence on which supervision was revoked).

However, Beets does not mean every sentencing “severs” the connection between custody and charges unrelated to the one on which the sentence is imposed. In State v. Yanick, 2007 WI App 30, 299 Wis.2d 456, 728 N.W.2d 365, the defendant was serving six months of confinement as a condition of probation for an OWI offense. While serving that condition time he was sentenced in an unrelated case. That sentence began running while he was serving condition time and was longer than the condition time.

When his probation on the OWI was revoked, he was entitled to credit toward the revocation sentence for the condition time despite the fact much of that time was concurrent to the sentence in the unrelated case:

¶22 To the extent the State is suggesting that Beets holds that service of a sentence on crime A always “severs” time in custody owing to crime B for purposes of awarding sentence credit on the sentence for crime B, we disagree. Beets addressed a particular type of status--time in custody serving a sentence and awaiting disposition on a separate crime. Beets does not address service of a sentence and concurrent service of custody time pursuant to a disposition, which is the sort of concurrent custody time at issue here.

Because Yanick was ultimately sentenced for the OWI for which he was confined as a condition of probation, his custody was factually connected to the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. See also State v. (Elandis) Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶¶42-44, 318 Wis.2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207 (discussing Yanick).

If an offender is in custody on a federal supervision hold based on state criminal charges and later receives a sentence for the state charges that is concurrent to the federal sentence, the offender is entitled to credit toward the state sentence for time spent in custody until the imposition of sentence in the federal case, which severed the connection between custody and the state charges. State v. Thomas, 2021 WI App 59, 399 Wis. 2d 165, 963 N.W.2d 927.

40. State v. Hintz, 2007 WI App 113, 300 Wis.2d 583, 731 N.W.2d 646. Hintz asked only for confinement up to his reconfinement hearing, which for purposes of § 973.155 is essentially a sentencing hearing. See State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis.2d 734, 715 N.W.2d 713. Courts no longer determine the amount of reconfinement after revocation of extended supervision, so the reconfinement hearing is not the point at which the offender’s sentence begins running again; instead the sentence resumes running when the person is returned to prison. Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4). State v. Davis, 2017 WI App 55, 377 Wis.2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488.

41. Depending on the situations, sentences begin to run or resume running at different times.

a) Sentences to confinement commence on the date of imposition. Wis. Stat. § 973.15(1). This provision covers situations in which sentence was originally withheld and probation imposed.

b) Following revocation of probation in the imposed-and-stayed-sentence-probation-imposed case, the sentence commences when the offender arrives at the prison. The revocation date is irrelevant. Wis. Stat. § 973.10(2)(b). See also State v. Slater, 2021 WI App 88, 400 Wis. 2d 93, 968 N.W.2d 740.

c) Sentences of revoked parolees or persons on extended supervision resume running on the date the person is received at the correctional institution. Wis. Stat. § 304.072(4). See also State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis. 2d 734, 715 N.W.2d 713; State v. Davis, 2017 WI App 55, 377 Wis. 2d 678, 901 N.W.2d 488.

42. State v. Beets, 124 Wis.2d 372, 383, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985).

43. State v. Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57, 389 Wis. 2d 69, 934 N.W.2d 905.

44. The Wisconsin Supreme Court approved of this general principle in State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis.2d 86, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), reversing 138 Wis.2d 292, 405 N.W.2d 767 (Ct. App. 1987). The essential dates and facts were as follows:

4/12/86 Boettcher, on probation with a three year stayed sentence, is arrested for a new offense; a probation hold is imposed.

4/22/86 Initial appearance on new charge; signature bond on new charge; probation hold remains in effect so Boettcher remains in custody.

7/23/86 Probation is revoked and the three year stayed sentence takes effect – on that sentence, credit for all days in custody from 4/12 through 7/23 (110 days) is awarded; sentence is imposed on new offense – 1 year to run consecutively to the other sentence – and no credit for time in custody is given.

The court of appeals held that additional credit should have been given on the sentence for the new crime for the 10 days between 4/12 and 4/22 – the time after arrest and before he was “released” on a signature bond for the new offense. (Of course, he was not released; he remained in custody on the probation hold.) The court reasoned that he was “in custody” on the new offense for this period and credit must be given against the eventual sentence on that offense. This is the case even though he received credit for that 10-day period on the other sentence resulting from the revoked probation.

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals, concluding “that dual credit is not permitted – that the time in custody is to be credited to the sentence first imposed – and that, where the sentences are consecutive, the total time to be served is thus reduced by the number of days in custody as defined by sec. 973.155, Stats. Credit is to be given on a day for day basis, which is not to be duplicatively credited to more than one of the sentences imposed to run consecutively.” 144 Wis.2d 86, 87.

This holding is consistent with SM-34A, which the court cited with approval:

We agree with, and endorse, the position of the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee’s language in SM-34A V.B., where, in discussing consecutive sentences, it concludes:

“The objective with consecutive sentences is to assure that credit is awarded against one, but only one, of the consecutive sentences.” 144 Wis.2d 86, 101.

The Boettcher rule also applies where a sentence has already been served: “The core idea of Boettcher is that ‘dual credit is not permitted’ where a defendant has already received credit against a sentence which has been, or will be, separately served.” State v. Jackson, 2000 WI App 41, ¶19, 233 Wis.2d 231, 607 N.W.2d 338. See also State v. Coles, 208 Wis.2d 328, 334, 559 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1997) (a defendant who was sentenced on one count to “time served” in an amount equal to his pretrial credit was not entitled to any credit on the prison sentence imposed for a second count; the prison sentence was consecutive to the “time served” sentence because the “time served” sentence was completed upon pronouncement of sentence); State v. Rohl, 160 Wis.2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying Boettcher to deny defendant credit for time served in California while he was on Wisconsin parole before his Wisconsin parole was revoked; because his parole was not revoked until after he was released in California and returned to Wisconsin, his post-revocation Wisconsin sentence was consecutive, not concurrent, to the California sentence); State v. Martinez, 2007 WI App 225, 305 Wis.2d 753, 741 N.W.2d 280 (reaching the same conclusion with respect to time served in a federal institution before the person’s Wisconsin parole was revoked).

Further, the Boettcher rule applies when one of several concurrent sentences is vacated and, after resentencing, is ordered to run consecutively to the previously imposed sentences with which it was originally running concurrent. State v. Lamar, 2011 WI 50, ¶¶35-37, 334 Wis.2d 536, 799 N.W.2d 758. Lamar was serving two concurrent sentences. He successfully challenged his conviction, but by the time he did so one of the sentences was finished. After he was reconvicted, the court imposed a new sentence, ordered it to run consecutively to any other sentence, and denied Lamar credit for the time he had served on the sentence that discharged before his conviction was vacated. The supreme court affirmed, holding “the time for which Lamar seeks credit was served on a separate, non-concurrent sentence. If Lamar received the sentence credit he seeks, he would receive dual credit from two consecutive sentences [for the same period of time]. As this court held in Boettcher, defendants are not entitled to receive this dual credit on a consecutive sentence.” 334 Wis.2d 536, ¶37 (citing a previous version of this Special Material). The court also concluded that § 973.04 – which requires credit for confinement previously served when a sentence is vacated and a new sentence imposed – was not inconsistent with application of Boettcher and that denial of the credit did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. 334 Wis.2d 536, ¶¶35, 43-50.

Finally, the Boettcher rule applies to cases in which an offender is seeking credit against consecutive sentences for a period of pretrial custody in two separate cases. State v. Trepanier, 2014 WI App 105, ¶14, 357 Wis.2d 662, 855 N.W.2d 465. Trepanier was in custody in both a pending criminal case and a civil commitment for contempt. When he was sentenced in the criminal case the judge ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the civil commitment. Boettcher did not preclude awarding credit for the time Trepanier was in both pretrial custody for the criminal case and custody under the civil commitment because the custody for the civil commitment was not pretrial custody. Id., ¶¶12-14.

45. State v. Wolfe, 2001 WI App 66, 242 Wis.2d 426, 625 N.W.2d 655.

46. See note 25, above.

47. Note, however, that if supervision has not yet been revoked, ordering the credit for the new offense may be required. In State v. (Eliseo) Brown, 2010 WI App 43, 324 Wis.2d 236, 781 N.W.2d 244, the defendant was held in custody in connection with a Wisconsin case and an Illinois parole hold. He was sentenced in Wisconsin first, and given a sentence consecutive to any other sentence. The circuit court denied him credit for his custody time on the theory Illinois might grant it to him, and thus give him improper “double credit.” The court of appeals held it must be applied to the Wisconsin sentence, as the question of “double credit” was not ripe because Illinois had not revoked his parole yet, and to deny credit on this sentence might mean he would never get it at all.

48. This section discusses the modification or correction of a sentence to reflect sentence credit where none, or an allegedly inadequate amount, had originally been given. See State v. Amos, 153 Wis.2d 257, 279-82, 450 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1989), for a case where a sentence was amended to eliminate sentence credit to which the defendant was not entitled.

49. State v. Obriecht, 2015 WI 66, ¶¶33-36, 42-47, 363 Wis.2d 816, 867 N.W.2d 387. Obriecht addressed the application of credit to an offender reincarcerated under § 302.11(7), which governs parole revocation, but § 302.113(9), which governs extended supervision revocation, is essentially identical to § 302.11(7). Thus, the Committee concludes Obriecht’s holding will also apply to offenders who have been reconfined under § 302.113(9).

50. State v. Lira, 2021 WI 81, ¶35, 399 Wis. 2d 419, 966 N.W.2d 605 (when a “convicted offender” is “made available to another jurisdiction,” sentence credit toward the offender’s Wisconsin sentence must conform to “the terms of s. 973.155).

51. For example, if the offender is serving a Wisconsin sentence and the other jurisdiction imposes a concurrent sentence, the Wisconsin sentence would continue to run—just as would be the case if the offender serving a sentence imposed in one county in Wisconsin was given a new, concurrent sentence in another Wisconsin county. If the other jurisdiction imposes a consecutive sentence, that would sever the connection between the offender’s custody and the Wisconsin case until the offender is returned to Wisconsin to complete the sentence imposed here. Cf. Lira, 399 Wis. 2d 419, ¶¶33. It might also be the case that the offender’s custody in the other jurisdiction before being sentencing there should be credited to the Wisconsin sentence because the offender was not given any credit for that time toward the sentence in the other jurisdiction.